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E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2016
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [YI](#) [EU](#) [BE](#)
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE FOLLOWUP: BRIEFING CAPITALS ON U.S.
KOSOVO POLICY

REF: A. STATE 59894
[1](#)B. BRUSSELS 1374

Classified By: POLCOUNS TED ANDREWS. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

[1](#)1. (C) Poloff met with Charles Delogne, MFA Adviser on the Balkans, to get additional information on Belgian views regarding U.S. policy on Kosovo status (refs A and B). Delogne had accompanied Belgian FM De Gucht to the Balkans in April as part of De Gucht's role as 2006 OSCE Chairman-in-Office.

[1](#)2. (C) Delogne said Belgium concurs with U.S. thinking on Kosovo. He said Belgium perhaps had "a few nuances in its position," but overall agreed with U.S. points (ref A). The United States and Europe needed to stay in "a strong partnership" in the Balkans, which provided a good opportunity for transatlantic cooperation. According to Delogne, the key was to stress to the parties involved that the U.S. and Europe shared the same approach and "cannot be divided."

[1](#)3. (C) Delogne had recently attended a Steering Group meeting on Kosovo. He said the Serbs were "less cooperative" than the Albanians, and thought the U.S./EU needed to use a "sticks and carrots" approach with the Serbs. He emphasized, however, that Belgium was strongly against marginalizing the Serbs and nothing must be imposed against the will of the Serbs. Delogne thought regional cooperation was the key to stability, with the Stability Pact a key tool for fostering regional cooperation.

[1](#)4. (C) Delogne thought it was essential that final status talks not be postponed ("this may be part of the Serb strategy"). He thought a "realistic calendar" was needed for concluding talks so as to not play into possible Serb desire to postpone the final outcome. Delogne said while he was not aware of any public comments or advocacy on Kosovo's final status, he was privy to private conversations that saw independence as probably the most realistic solution.

[1](#)5. (C) Delogne stressed the need for quick implementation of standards, particularly on minority rights. He said Belgian FM De Gucht felt strongly that final status could not be effectively implemented without tangible progress on implementing standards. He thought Serb cooperation would come easier then. Delogne said "unfortunately, it is not a priority of the Albanians, which is bad because they lose credibility with the Serbs."

KOROLOGOS

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